A Bigger BRICS, A Bigger Test: Can India Shape A Stronger Global South?

When leaders of the expanded BRICS grouping gather in New Delhi today, the significance of the summit will go beyond the size of the bloc or the number of countries at the table. With the global economy facing trade tensions, geopolitical conflicts, energy insecurity and repeated supply-chain disruptions, the real test for BRICS will be whether its growing economic weight can be converted into practical cooperation in trade, investment, energy and technology and whether India can use its presidency to give the Global South a stronger and more credible voice.

The 18th BRICS Summit, being hosted by India today and tomorrow, comes at a time when the global economic order is undergoing considerable change. The grouping now has 11 members and a wider network of partner countries, together accounting for about half of the world's population, around 40 per cent of global GDP and more than a quarter of global trade. The expansion has given BRICS enormous economic and demographic weight, but it has also made the grouping more diverse and difficult to manage.

BRICS began as a grouping of Brazil, Russia, India and China, with South Africa joining later. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates became full members in 2024, while Indonesia joined in 2025. The enlarged grouping now brings together major energy producers, manufacturing powers, commodity exporters and some of the world's largest consumer markets. Its transformation from a relatively focused economic grouping into a broader platform for developing countries has also increased expectations that it should play a larger role in global governance.

But greater size does not automatically translate into greater influence. BRICS members have different political systems, economic structures and foreign-policy priorities. India and China continue to manage strategic differences, Russia's relationship with the West remains deeply affected by the Ukraine conflict, and tensions involving Iran and the wider West Asia region have created another difficult test for the grouping. The challenge for India will be to find areas of common interest without trying to force its members into a single geopolitical position.

Trade is likely to be one of the clearest measures of whether BRICS can become more effective. Intra-BRICS trade has grown dramatically, reaching around $1.17 trillion in 2024, compared with about $84 billion in 2003. Yet India's own trade relationship with BRICS also exposes the imbalance within the grouping. India's total goods trade with BRICS was around $417.5 billion in FY2026, while its trade deficit with the bloc widened to about $226.1 billion, from $74.5 billion in FY2021.

For India, therefore, simply increasing the volume of trade will not be enough. The larger objective will have to be improving the quality and balance of that trade. China supplies India with large quantities of electronics, machinery, chemicals and industrial inputs. Russia has become a major source of crude oil and fertilisers. The Gulf members are important for energy, investment and logistics, while Brazil offers opportunities in agriculture, food products and minerals. South Africa is significant for minerals and other commodities. India, meanwhile, has competitive strengths in pharmaceuticals, engineering goods, automobiles and components, textiles, food products and information technology.

The opportunity is to make it easier for these strengths to move across BRICS markets. At the BRICS Business Forum, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar emphasised resilient supply chains and predictable business conditions, while Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal called for greater market access, reduced non-tariff barriers and stronger payment links. If these priorities result in concrete agreements, BRICS could become more relevant to exporters, manufacturers and small businesses. If they remain declarations, the bloc's enormous trade potential will continue to be underused.

Investment is another area where BRICS could move from broad political commitments to measurable outcomes. The New Development Bank, established by the BRICS countries in 2014, was created to support infrastructure and sustainable development projects. It remains much smaller than institutions such as the World Bank, but its ability to finance projects in developing economies and increase lending in local currencies gives it strategic importance.

The bank has financed around 120 sustainable infrastructure projects worth roughly $39 billion, according to recent assessments, while its membership has expanded beyond the original BRICS countries. Greater use of local currencies in development finance could help member countries reduce exposure to currency fluctuations and expensive foreign borrowing. For India and other emerging economies, expanding this form of financing could be one of the most tangible benefits of BRICS cooperation.

The question of payments is closely connected to trade and finance. BRICS members have discussed increasing the use of national currencies and improving cross-border payment systems. A common BRICS currency, however, is unlikely to emerge in the near term because of major differences in monetary policies, exchange rates, financial systems and economic priorities. A more practical approach would be to make settlements in national currencies faster, cheaper and easier.

India's UPI and digital public infrastructure could play an important role in such an effort. Greater interoperability between payment systems could particularly benefit small exporters, tourists, service providers and MSMEs. Instead of attempting to create a single BRICS financial system overnight, the grouping could gradually build a network of payment and settlement mechanisms that reduces transaction costs.

Technology could provide another way to deepen cooperation. India has been pushing initiatives such as a BRICS Incubator Network, a Startup Innovation Fund and a framework for logistics and supply-chain cooperation. These proposals could give the grouping an economic character that goes beyond government-to-government relations.

Artificial intelligence, fintech, health technology, renewable energy, agricultural technology and cybersecurity are areas where BRICS countries have different but complementary strengths. India can showcase its digital public infrastructure and growing startup ecosystem, while other members can contribute manufacturing capacity, research, capital, natural resources and large consumer markets. The real test will be whether these initiatives create actual partnerships, funding opportunities and market access for startups and MSMEs.

Energy is likely to be even more important. BRICS brings together some of the world's biggest energy producers and consumers. Russia is a major oil and gas producer, Gulf members possess enormous energy resources, Brazil has significant natural resources, while India and China are among the world's largest energy consumers. This creates scope for cooperation in oil and gas, renewable energy, nuclear power, green hydrogen and critical minerals.

Recent developments in West Asia have made energy security an immediate concern. Any disruption around the Strait of Hormuz can affect oil and gas supplies and shipping costs far beyond the region. For India, which remains heavily dependent on imported energy, diversification of suppliers and transport routes is therefore as important as securing competitive prices. BRICS could explore cooperation in strategic energy reserves, alternative supply routes, renewable energy and critical-mineral supply chains.

The summit also comes after an important diplomatic engagement between India and Russia. Prime Minister Narendra Modi met Russian President Vladimir Putin in New Delhi on September 11, a day before the summit, with discussions covering political, economic, defence and energy ties as well as developments in West Asia and Ukraine. Russia has become an increasingly important source of crude oil for India, making the relationship significant not only diplomatically but also for India's energy security.

The India-China relationship will be another major focus. Prime Minister Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping are expected to meet on the sidelines of the summit, with trade, investment and supply-chain issues likely to figure alongside broader bilateral concerns. India's growing trade deficit with China and concerns over market access remain difficult issues, even as both countries recognise the economic importance of stable supply chains.

China's economic weight also presents a larger question for BRICS. The grouping cannot ignore China's role as its largest economy, but neither can India allow BRICS to become dominated by the priorities of any one member. This makes India's role particularly important. New Delhi has consistently sought strategic autonomy and maintained partnerships with countries inside and outside BRICS.

India is therefore unlikely to push for BRICS to become an explicitly anti-Western bloc. Its approach is more likely to be that BRICS should provide a non-Western platform without becoming an anti-Western alliance. India has strong economic, technological and strategic relationships with the United States, Europe, Japan and other partners. Its interest is in reforming global institutions and increasing the voice of developing countries without creating another rigid geopolitical camp.

The conflicts in Ukraine and West Asia will test how far such an approach can work. Iran's membership gives the West Asia crisis particular importance for BRICS, while differences among members over major geopolitical issues make a common political position difficult. India may therefore have to concentrate on practical areas where consensus is possible — development finance, trade, energy security, technology, food security and resilient supply chains rather than attempting to make BRICS speak with one voice on every international crisis.

That may ultimately be the most realistic measure of success. A strong BRICS does not necessarily have to be a bloc whose members agree on everything. It can instead be a platform where countries with different political and strategic interests cooperate wherever their economic interests overlap. The larger the grouping becomes, the more important such an approach will be.

The real test, however, will begin after the summit ends tomorrow. Announcements on trade will have to translate into better market access. Investment commitments will need projects and financing. Discussions on local currencies will need functioning payment mechanisms. Startup initiatives will have to connect entrepreneurs across borders. Supply-chain cooperation will have to help businesses withstand disruptions, while energy cooperation will have to address the vulnerabilities exposed by geopolitical conflicts.

By 2030, a successful BRICS could have deeper intra-group trade, greater use of national currencies, stronger development-finance flows, interoperable digital payment systems, wider technology partnerships and more resilient energy and supply chains. None of this requires the members to surrender their independent foreign policies. It requires them to identify common economic interests and build institutions capable of delivering on them.

For India, that is the opportunity presented by the New Delhi summit. The country does not need BRICS to replace its other international partnerships. Instead, it can seek to make the grouping more useful to its members and more relevant to the wider Global South. If India can help bridge the differences between major powers while keeping development and economic cooperation at the centre, its BRICS presidency could leave behind something more durable than another summit declaration.

The significance of BRICS 2026, therefore, will not ultimately be measured by the number of leaders attending the New Delhi meeting or the size of the bloc on paper. It will be measured by what happens to trade, investment, energy, technology and supply chains in the months and years that follow. India's challenge is to turn BRICS from a platform of shared concerns into a platform of shared solutions from symbolism to systems, from declarations to delivery.