Modi@12: National Security and the Modi Doctrine, Successes, Costs and Questions

Few areas define Narendra Modi's twelve years in power more than national security. From the abrogation of Article 370 to surgical strikes across the Line of Control, from Doklam and Galwan to Operation Sindoor, the Modi government has projected an image of decisive leadership willing to break with decades of strategic caution. Supporters celebrate this as the emergence of a confident India that no longer absorbs provocations passively. Critics ask a harder question: have these actions translated into durable security gains, or merely changed the optics of security while leaving deeper challenges unresolved?

The Modi government's security doctrine rests on three pillars: political integration at home, proactive military retaliation against terrorism, and a tougher border posture against China and Pakistan. Together, these policies have reshaped India's strategic behaviour and public expectations of state response.

The most consequential domestic security decision was the abrogation of Article 370 and Article 35A in 2019. The government argued that Jammu and Kashmir's special status fostered separatism and hindered integration. There were visible gains: stone-pelting declined, welfare schemes expanded, and infrastructure development accelerated. For supporters, the move completed India's constitutional integration.

Yet security cannot be measured solely through administrative control. The revocation was accompanied by a lockdown, communications blackout, and detention of political leaders, raising concerns about civil liberties. More importantly, militancy evolved rather than disappeared. The 2025 Pahalgam terror attack underscored that Pakistan-backed terrorism remains a reality. Meanwhile, Ladakh, carved out as a separate Union Territory, has witnessed protests demanding constitutional safeguards and greater autonomy. A policy intended to strengthen integration has also generated new debates over identity and representation.

The government's second major innovation was its shift from strategic restraint to visible retaliation. The 2016 surgical strikes, the 2019 Balakot airstrike, and Operation Sindoor in 2025 signalled that India would no longer absorb terrorist attacks without imposing costs. These actions boosted public morale and demonstrated military capability.

However, strategic success must be judged by outcomes rather than symbolism. Pakistan's support for anti-India militant groups has not fundamentally disappeared, and terror incidents continue. Military strikes can punish perpetrators and raise costs, but they cannot by themselves eliminate the structures that sustain militancy. Tactical victories do not necessarily produce strategic resolution.

Several major crises also raised questions about intelligence and preparedness. From Galwan to Pahalgam and the prolonged unrest in Manipur, the issue is not merely how effectively the state responded, but whether these crises could have been anticipated or mitigated. A strong security state is one that prevents crises, not only retaliates after them.

The greatest challenge to the government's security narrative emerged from China. The 2017 Doklam standoff was hailed as evidence that India could stand firm against Chinese pressure. Yet the 2020 Galwan clash, which killed twenty Indian soldiers, exposed the fragility of assumptions that diplomacy had stabilized relations.

India responded with troop deployments, accelerated border infrastructure, economic restrictions on Chinese firms, and greater military preparedness. Yet more than five years later, the Line of Actual Control remains heavily militarized, with roughly 50,000 to 60,000 troops on either side. Despite disengagement agreements, debates continue over buffer zones and access to traditional patrolling areas. Whether India is strategically better positioned today than before the Ladakh crisis remains contested.

National security also extends beyond borders. The 2020 Delhi riots exposed failures in policing and intelligence, while the ethnic conflict in Manipur since 2023 has become one of the gravest internal security crises of the Modi era. More than 250 people have been killed and over 60,000 displaced. If Article 370 was presented as a model of national integration, Manipur became a reminder that territorial unity alone does not guarantee social cohesion.

One area where the government can claim significant success is the fight against Left-Wing Extremism. Maoist violence has declined sharply due to security operations, improved connectivity, welfare delivery, and a stronger state presence. Yet tribal displacement, forest rights disputes, land alienation, and uneven development continue to affect many regions. The decline of Maoist violence does not automatically mean the grievances that fuelled it have disappeared.

A broader challenge lies in India's neighbourhood. Relations with Pakistan remain frozen, ties with China remain adversarial, and political uncertainty in parts of South Asia continues to test India's regional influence. Security is not only about military strength but also about maintaining a stable strategic environment.

The Modi era has undoubtedly transformed India's approach to national security. It has replaced strategic restraint with visible retaliation, strengthened border infrastructure, reduced Maoist violence, and pursued deeper political integration. Yet unresolved questions remain. Kashmir is politically unsettled, Ladakh seeks safeguards, Manipur remains fragile, terrorism persists, and China continues to be India's foremost strategic challenge.

Twelve years later, India appears more assertive and willing to use hard power than before. But national security is ultimately measured not by the symbolism of strength or the frequency of retaliation, but by the creation of lasting peace, trusted institutions, and resilient communities. Whether India is fundamentally more secure remains the defining question of the Modi legacy.