Modi@12: The Government Has Grown Stronger. Have Institutions Become Stronger and More Accountable?

Few governments in independent India have accumulated as much political authority as Narendra Modi's. Few have simultaneously faced as many questions about the institutions meant to restrain that authority. After twelve years in power, the central question is no longer whether the Indian state has become stronger. It plainly has. The more difficult question is whether the institutions that safeguard democratic accountability have kept pace with the expansion of executive power.

By many measures, the Modi years have transformed the capacity of the Indian state. Infrastructure construction has accelerated, welfare delivery has become increasingly digitised, tax collection has improved, and India's digital public infrastructure has gained global recognition. The Prime Minister's Office has emerged as the undisputed centre of policymaking, replacing much of the fragmented decision-making that characterised the coalition era.

Yet democracy is not judged solely by the efficiency of governments. It is judged by the strength of institutions that can question those governments.

The defining political story of the past decade has been the concentration of authority in the executive. Elections, policy announcements and welfare programmes have increasingly revolved around a single leader and a centralised decision-making structure. Such concentration may enhance administrative efficiency, but democratic systems are designed not merely to facilitate power, but to restrain it.

The judiciary illustrates this tension. The government deserves credit for expanding digital infrastructure through the e-Courts programme and virtual hearings. At the same time, concerns regarding judicial independence have intensified. The prolonged standoff over judicial appointments following the striking down of the National Judicial Appointments Commission in 2015 exposed growing friction between the executive and the judiciary. Delays in clearing collegium recommendations created the perception that the government had acquired an informal influence over appointments.

The unprecedented 2018 press conference by four sitting Supreme Court judges warning that "democracy is in danger" remains a watershed moment. Likewise, delays in hearing politically consequential cases involving Article 370, electoral bonds, Pegasus surveillance allegations and anti-defection disputes fuelled concerns about selective urgency. The nomination of former Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi to the Rajya Sabha shortly after retirement further sharpened questions about the relationship between the judiciary and the executive. None of these developments proves institutional compromise, but together they have weakened public confidence in judicial independence.

The Election Commission faces a similar challenge. Administratively, it remains one of the world's most remarkable electoral institutions. Yet its credibility has increasingly become a subject of political contestation. Opposition parties have repeatedly alleged voter-list irregularities, questioned aspects of EVM functioning, criticised election scheduling decisions and accused the Commission of inconsistent enforcement of the Model Code of Conduct. The Commission has rejected these allegations and no court has found evidence of systematic electoral manipulation.

The issue, however, is larger than the allegations themselves. Democratic institutions derive legitimacy not only from legality but also from public trust. When substantial sections of the political opposition repeatedly question the neutrality of the election referee, institutions must do more than assert their independence; they must visibly reinforce it.

The electoral bonds controversy deepened these concerns. Defended by the government as a reform of political funding, the scheme was criticised for increasing opacity in campaign finance. The Supreme Court's decision to strike it down in 2024 reinforced the argument that transparency had been sacrificed in favour of political convenience.

Questions about accountability have been even more pronounced in the functioning of investigative agencies. The Enforcement Directorate and the CBI have acquired unprecedented visibility and influence over the past decade. The government argues that stronger enforcement reflects a serious anti-corruption effort. Critics point to the dramatic expansion of investigations, relatively modest conviction rates and what they describe as a pattern of selective targeting.

Opposition leaders have repeatedly alleged that central agencies are used disproportionately against political opponents. Cases involving leaders such as Ajit Pawar, Himanta Biswa Sarma and Suvendu Adhikari are frequently cited by critics who argue that political realignment often appears to reduce the intensity of scrutiny. Whether such allegations are fair is ultimately less important than the fact that they persist. Institutions survive not only on legal authority but also on public credibility.

The broader bureaucracy has experienced a similar transformation. Direct Benefit Transfers, Aadhaar-linked welfare systems and digital governance have undoubtedly improved efficiency. Yet increasing centralisation and the growing influence of the Prime Minister's Office have raised concerns about the autonomy of the civil service. A bureaucracy may become more effective in executing decisions while becoming less willing to question them.

Parliament has perhaps undergone the most significant institutional change. Legislative productivity has increased, but deliberative scrutiny has declined sharply. According to PRS Legislative Research, nearly 71 per cent of Bills introduced during the 15th Lok Sabha were referred to Parliamentary Standing Committees. That figure fell to around 27 per cent during the 16th Lok Sabha and to roughly 16 per cent during the 17th Lok Sabha.

The farm laws, passed without committee scrutiny and later repealed after a year-long agitation, became the most visible example of this trend. Similar concerns were raised regarding the Citizenship Amendment Act, the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act and the new criminal law codes. Parliament's constitutional role is not merely to pass legislation but to scrutinise it. A legislature that debates less and refers fewer Bills for examination may enact more laws, but it performs less of its democratic function.

Beyond constitutional institutions, concerns have also emerged regarding the broader democratic ecosystem. Questions about media concentration, pressures on independent journalism and shrinking space for adversarial scrutiny have become increasingly prominent. Tax investigations, regulatory actions and legal proceedings involving media organisations critical of the government have fuelled perceptions that the cost of dissent has risen.

Federalism has also come under strain. Opposition-ruled states have repeatedly accused the Centre of fiscal centralisation, inadequate consultation and the political use of Governors' offices. Whether these accusations are fully justified remains debated. What is undeniable is the growing perception that power within the Union has become increasingly concentrated in New Delhi.

The persistence of criminalisation in politics presents another challenge. According to the Association for Democratic Reforms, nearly 46 per cent of MPs elected to the 2024 Lok Sabha declared criminal cases against themselves, while around 31 per cent faced serious criminal charges. This trend predates the Modi government and implicates all major parties. Yet after twelve years of dominant rule and repeated promises of clean governance, the failure to significantly reverse it raises difficult questions about the gap between anti-corruption rhetoric and political practice.

India is not alone in confronting these tensions. Across democracies, strong executives have increasingly come into conflict with institutional restraints. The challenge everywhere is the same: how to reconcile electoral mandates with constitutional accountability.

The concern today is not that India has ceased to be a democracy. Elections remain competitive, governments continue to lose power, and courts still rule against the state. The danger is more gradual. Institutions rarely weaken through dramatic constitutional breakdowns. More often, they become increasingly cautious, increasingly deferential and less willing to challenge concentrated power.

Modi@12 presents a democratic paradox. India has built a stronger, more capable and more centralised state. Yet many of the institutions meant to scrutinise that power face growing questions about their autonomy, credibility and ability to act independently.

History rarely remembers governments only for the roads they built, the welfare schemes they launched or the elections they won. It remembers the institutions they leave behind. Strong leaders are common in history. Strong institutions are rare. The ultimate test of the Modi era will not be the strength of the government it created, but whether India's democratic institutions emerged from it stronger, weaker, or more dependent on the goodwill of those in power.