Strategic Autonomy Needs Red Lines, Not Empty Chairs

The most revealing moment at this year's Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) meeting was not who attended, but what India refused to endorse. As External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar reiterated that there can be "no double standards, no whitewashing and no justification" for terrorism, New Delhi signalled that participation in multilateral institutions does not require acquiescence to narratives that dilute accountability. In the aftermath of the Pahalgam terror attack and Operation Sindoor, India's message was unmistakable: strategic engagement cannot come at the expense of strategic clarity.

This captures the paradox of India's Eurasian diplomacy. While strengthening the Quad to uphold a free and open Indo-Pacific, India also remains an active member of the SCO alongside China and Pakistan. Far from being a contradiction, this reflects an increasingly multipolar world in which influence is preserved not by vacating difficult forums but by contesting them from within.

The SCO was established in 2001 to combat the "Three Evils" of terrorism, separatism and extremism. Its Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) was designed to institutionalise intelligence sharing and coordinated action. Yet the organisation has struggled to translate rhetoric into results because its consensus-based decision-making allows political considerations to override collective security. When key members disagree over identifying perpetrators or sponsors of terrorism, institutional paralysis becomes inevitable.

India's criticism is therefore aimed not merely at terrorist groups but at the selective politics surrounding them. Pakistan's security establishment has long been accused by India and numerous international observers of using militant proxies as instruments of strategic leverage while seeking diplomatic legitimacy in multilateral forums. A regional organisation cannot credibly champion counterterrorism if one of its members is repeatedly accused of tolerating or enabling cross-border extremist networks.

China's role deepens this contradiction. Beijing presents itself as uncompromising against terrorism, particularly regarding Xinjiang, yet its diplomatic support for Pakistan has repeatedly complicated international counterterrorism efforts. Its past technical holds on UN sanctions against Pakistan-based terrorists and its continued expansion of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir expose the tension between China's declared opposition to terrorism and its broader geopolitical priorities. Counterterrorism cannot remain credible when strategic partnerships determine its application.

Ironically, China also benefits from India's continued presence in the SCO. Without India, the organisation would appear increasingly like a China-Russia bloc with limited global legitimacy. India's participation broadens the SCO's international profile even as New Delhi refuses to endorse initiatives that compromise its sovereignty. Engagement, therefore, serves both sides, albeit for very different reasons.

India's participation should not be mistaken for bilateral normalisation with Pakistan. New Delhi has consistently maintained that meaningful dialogue depends on verifiable action against cross-border terrorism. Attending SCO meetings fulfils multilateral obligations; it does not erase bilateral red lines.

The same principle shapes India's approach to regional connectivity. Pakistan continues to deny India overland access to Afghanistan and Central Asia, undermining the very integration the SCO claims to promote. India, meanwhile, has consistently withheld support for the Belt and Road Initiative because the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor passes through territory it claims as its own. Connectivity divorced from sovereignty risks institutionalising disputes rather than resolving them.

Instead, India has invested in alternatives such as the International North-South Transport Corridor and Chabahar Port, emphasising transparent financing, financial sustainability and respect for territorial integrity. Infrastructure should connect markets, not legitimise contested borders.

Beyond security, India's presence serves a wider geopolitical purpose. As a member of the Quad, BRICS and the SCO, India refuses to be confined within rival blocs. This is not ideological inconsistency but independent statecraft. Equally important, Russia continues to value India's participation as a balancing force within Eurasia, preventing the organisation from becoming overwhelmingly Sino-centric despite Moscow's growing dependence on Beijing.

Central Asian republics also benefit from India's engagement. For countries seeking to diversify beyond excessive dependence on China and Russia, India offers partnerships in pharmaceuticals, digital public infrastructure, education, energy and capacity building. A genuinely multipolar Asia requires multiple credible partners.

India's strategy nevertheless has limits. Speeches alone have not dismantled terrorist infrastructure, China's geopolitical calculations remain unchanged, and India's economic footprint in Central Asia is still constrained. Yet diplomacy is not measured only by immediate outcomes. Sometimes its greatest value lies in preventing dangerous ideas from acquiring international legitimacy.

Strategic autonomy has never meant standing equidistant from every power. It means engaging all, while yielding to none. The real test of the SCO is no longer whether it can issue stronger declarations against terrorism. It is whether it is willing to confront the political interests that continue to shield it. Until then, every promise of collective security risks sounding less like policy and more like ritual.